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In Chapter IT of this paper, the Marine Corps Staff Manual
vas usee as a source for most of the material in the chapter.
This manual at present is merely in the rough form is
intendi or instructional use only at Marine Corps Schools,
Quantico, Virginia. It h i not yet been published in its final
form and therefore is not an official document.
ost of the materiel for this paper was obtained through
interviews at Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Schools
There vas very little written material available es reference,
so in many cases the author made assumptions that seemed valid
to him but in no sense should this paper be construed as the
views of the Marine Corps.
The cutbor wishes to express his thanks to the many people
ft Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Schools that
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The big businessman of today realizes that he occupies
the position held traditionally by the banker of years past.
Both the financial security of his community and the welfare of
the nation may depend upon the efficient operation of his busi-
ness. Outside of government, he is the most potent force in the
nation today. No area of his business is safe from scrutiny of
the basis of improving operations. Probably one of the most
vital segments subject to this scrutiny is the organizational
structure of the business. In the rest of this chapter it will
be shown that many companies owe their present organizational
structure to the military model.
Early businesses were adequately operated by one man.
Generally speaking, at that time the only large organizations were
military. When a business began to increase in size, it could
readily adopt the pattern of the army structure. This structure
was quite simple. The equivalent of a non-commissioned officer
was in charge of a group. These leaders themselves were respon-
sible to a ranking officer. On a chart this would look like a
large triangle made up of smaller triangles. At the top, one
commander. The logical symmetry and simplicity of the army
organization readily lent itself to business. Today this form of
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The first refinement of organization in the army itself
seemed to be necessitated by the problem of feeding vast numbers
of troops. Fighting men could no longer forage for themselves and
so one man was made responsible for the procurement of food. Here
was the birth of the so-called "service" element, a part of what
is known as the staff. In defining the word staff, it is under-
stood that any function which is not primarily connected with the
principal miseion of the organization be known as a staff func-
tion.
As our hypothetical business becomes larger it becomes
evident that each man cannot perform every detail inherent in his
particular job. Again, following the army plan, a specialist is
named to accomplish a certain portion of these tasks. An early
specialist or staff task could be one as simple as supplying
drinking water to other workers. The water carrier is not pro-
ductive and as such fits in with our definition of staff.
So far we have discussed our staff function, that of ser-
vice to the line organization. Now let us see if another staff
function, called planning, could have come from the same source.
Planning is necessary in everything a person does. Any
early businessman had to plan to know how much work he as an in-
dividual intended to do during the day. In comparison, an army
commander frequently called councils of war to help him make his
plans. The council, however, functioned for one particular
problem. In the early 19th century the Prussian army, under
Scharnhorst 's urging, first set up a group of men whose full-time
duty was planning. This group was known as the general staff.
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It was the increasing size and complexity of the army which was
the main reasons for the origin of this group. Even at this
relatively recent date the Prussian army was probably the largest
organization in the state. Certainly, knowing the Prussian
heritage, it was the most important. Once more, using the mili-
tary structure as a guide, business adopted this idea of a planning
staff.
With the addition of the planning function we have
developed the basic skeleton of the line and staff organization.
This basic skeleton has remained unchanged to this day.
The line is the arm that actually does the work. The
staff provides tools for the arm with the service function, and
aids the brain by means of the planning function.
Because of this heritage of business to the military in
regards to this type of organization, an example will be shown
in later chapters of a military organization of the line and
staff structure that failed and the reasons for its failure.
These reasons are applicable to civilian operations as well as
military.







THE S4 - STAFF OFFICER
The Staff Manual of the U. S. Marine Corps describes the
Individual and collective duties of staffs and staff members at
all levels in the Corps. Though similar in many ways, Marine and
Army staffs are not parallel in structure. The Marine Corps is
an organization in which individual assignments, unit missions and
organizations determine the character and effort of the subordinate
elements. There are no separate arms or services which special
staff officers represent, as in the Army. Though the staff officer
is not necessarily a specialist in his field, he is required to
have a knowledge of the operations, organization, administration,
staff proceedings and the capabilities and limitations of all the
elements of the command. Also he must have an understanding and
appreciation of the problems of the subordinate troop units and
should have had experience in these units. The staff officer must
be able to express his ideas and recommendations clearly. Notice
that one of the requirements for staff duty is experience in a line
unit of the organization. This is something that many times is
not required today in business. A common criticism of staff men
is that they are too often concerned with things, not people. By
Insuring that staff members at one time have been in the position
of the line, chances of being accused of this failing are lessened.
As far as the staff's relationship with comman.., the Staff
Manual specifies that the commander alone is responsible for the
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success or failure of his unit. This is the one basic responsi-
bility that cannot be delegated. In the commander's discharge
of his responsibilities, the staff is not in the command chain.
The staff does not issue any orders or plans, but rather they
are issued through the regular command channels. These command
channels are through the line organization.
"3 to what comprises the staff, they are defined as those
people who assist the commander in the implementation of his
command responsibilities. Members of the staff possess co-equal
status as regards their inter-staff relationships. Each staff
member has equal access to and opportunity to present matters of
importance to the commander.
Command of the staff remains with the commander. In a
general staff, the actions of the staff are co-ordinated by the
Chief of Staff; on a regimental or battalion level by the
Executive Officer, (the second in command).
The methods by which the staff assists the commander are
by procuring information required by the commander, planning,
staff supervision of the execution of orders, maintaining records
and preparing reports, and bringing to thp commander's attention
such matters that require his action or about which he should be
informed.
There are different types of staffs. A colander's aides
constitute his personal staff. The general staff is concerned
with overall planning. This is broken down into four areas under
the four general staff officers. The first area, (Gl), is con-




the providing of Intelligence; the third, (03), la charged with
Training and Operations; the fourth, (G4), has the Logistics
responsibility. There is yet one more staff, The Special Staff,
which advises the commander in regards to their special skills,
such as artillery, naval gunfire support, etc.
In the regimental and battalion staffs there is no
personal staff for the commander and the battalion staff corre-
sponds to the general staff. The Special Staff functions the
same in regards to any special area which the commander may
direct his attention.
The general (and battalion or regimental) staff are
nrimarily advisors, planners, co-ordinat-^rs and supervisors.
They must keep themselves free for continuously estimating the
situation and planning. They must not allow themselves to become
engrossed with the operations of units and activities which are
the functions of commanders and special staff officers.
The action that a staff officer takes is in three forms.
These forms are Individual action, co-ordinated action with other
members of the line or staff, and action requiring a decision by
the commander. In co-ordinated action, the conference is stressed
These conferences should have definite agenda and follow parlia-
mentary rules.
In regards to the performance of staff supervision,
probably the major complaint against staff officers, the staff is
instructed to be unobtrusive and avoid interference with the pre-
rogatives of subordinate commanders. The staff officer must not




function as part of a spy system, but should notify any command-
ing officer that he intends to visit his unit.
It Is interesting to note that in line with the increas-
ing trend towards decentralization and semi-autonomy in modern
business, the military in its organization has had varying
degrees of decentralization in its battalions and regiments. At
any rate, the prerogatives of any commander, no matter what level
he is in the chain of command, are jealously guarded by the com-
mander. The staff officer rau3t exercise considerable tact to
insure that he does not intend to usurp any of these prerogatives.
Thus far in the chapter principles, duties, and qualifi-
cations of staff officers in general have been discussed. Now the
duties of a particular staff officer, the G4 on the general staff
and the 34 on the regimental and battalion staff a, will be
illustrated.
The G4's and S4*s primary responsibility is in the field
of logistics. This takes In the fields of supply, evacuation and
hospitalization, transportation and troop movements, service, and
other miscellaneous functions.
Supply consists of planning supply requirements, requisi-
tioning, procuring, storing and distributing these supplies,
allocating critical materials, salvage, and collecting and dis-
posing of excess supplies.
Transportation has to do with preparing plans for trans-
porting units or personnel by land, sea, or air, selecting non-













8service unite, and plana for the movement of service units.
Evacuation and hospitalization include transportation of
casualties and the facilities for treatment.
The service function recommends requirements for employ-
ment of service units and indigenous personnel, planning the
maintenance of existing facilities, recommending acquisition,
allocation, improvement and disposition of real estate, fiscal
plans, reflations governing property accounting, plans for
sanitation measures, and supervising- food services.
One point that should be emphasized is that the staff
officer is not directly responsible for the execution of these
plans. Everything above is a plan, with the exception of the
supervision of the food services. The staff responsibility is
the formation and development of plans that are feasible and
practical.
Supervision by the staff is a function that is frequently
criticized. Alvin Brown, in his book The Armor of Organization
,
states that if a plan is well thought out, it will need no further
interpretation or amplification. The line mi therefore is
responsible to his superior in the chain of command for the
proper execution of the plan. Mr. Brown further contends that
staff supervision, which he believes 1b inseparable with actual
control, is the appointment of someone else other than the super-
visor to see that the supervisor does his Job. Certainly it is
Alvin Brov/n, The Armor of Organization
.
(New York:






9an area that the Marine Corps recognizes as a dangerous one, as
it cautions the staff nan not to trespass into the domain of the
line operator in thi3 respect. Whether this admonition alone is
enough to keep the staff out of line operations is a moot ques-
tion.
Thus far the staff role of planning has been explained.
In the next chapter the service »1*B< at, as it li conducted in




As Service Battery was an Integral part of the 105
millimeter howitzer ba+talion under the K Tables of Organization,
it night be best to describe the organization of the battalion.
^he tuition of the battalion is to furnish artillery
support for the infantry elements of a Marine Division. One
Infantry regiment normally has priority on the battalion fires,
but the artillery regimental headquarters may direct Its firing
elsewhere. The battalion has the necessary personnel and replace*
ment items to operate with an infantry regiment for thirty days
with replenishment of consumable supplies.
Under the K tables the battalion was made up of five
butteries. Three of these batteries were identical in structure.
These were the flring batteries, each with some 130 men manning
six 105 millimeter howitzers per battery. Bach battery, rein-
forced with extra personnel from battalion headquarter, could be
attached to an infantry battalion for a small amphibious opera-
tion.
The fourth battery was Headquarters Battery. In It were
the fire direction, communication, and survey personnel along
with the necessary housekeeping troops for the battalion head-
quarters.
The la.Pt battery was Service Battery. This was organized
into two platoons, service and ammunition, two separate sections,
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personnel and battery service, and the battery headquarters.
Service platoon consisted of three sections, supply, motor
maintenance, and ordnance maintenance. Each of theBe sections had
an officer in charge. The ammunition platoon had three ammunition
sections with an officer in command of the platoon. The battal-
ion personnel section served under the adjutant and his assistant,
the personnel officer. The battery service section contained
batter/ bu] ly, motor transport and office personnel*
Each of the sections and platoons, with the exception of
the battery service section, had the mission of providing their
services for the battalion as a whole. Thus, the supply section
consisted of the battalion supply officer, the top supply non-
commissioned officer, and sufficiency personnel to maintain the
battalion supply records and warehouse. The motor and ordnance
maintenance section were set up along basically the same lines.
The ammunition platoon was in charge of the battalion ammunition
dump and the supply of ammunition to the three firing batteries.
Motor transportation for this purpose was furnished by the Service
Battery service section. The battalion personnel had the office
personnel in both the adjutant's and personnel officer's offices.
Their function was the assignment of personnel, maintenance of
personnel records and the stenographic duties in connection with
the adjutant's work.
The Service Battery commander was responsible for the
leadership, training, operation and morale of his battery. As the
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complex units of its size (117 officers and men) in the Marine
Corps. While the entire battery was theoretically under the
control of the battery commander, in some cases the chain of
command was violated. This chain of command started with the
battalion commander, down to the Service Battery commander and
through him to the men in his battery. In the adjutant's case,
however, he, as the SI and member of the battalion staff, dealt
directly with the commanding officer of the battalion. In effect
the SI was carried on Service Battery roles as a matter of record
only. Another interesting problem of the command chain was the
position of the personnel officer. On the organization chart he
was responsible to the adjutant for the proper performance of
his Job. Theoretically the adjutant is responsible to the
Service Battery commander for the operation of his section. How
much authority did the Service Battery Commander have in dealing
with the personnel officer? In most cases the adjutant was left
strictly In charge of his section, with the Service Battery com-
mander responsible for the messing, billeting, and schooling
in basic military subjects of the troops in the personnel section.
Service Battery, as it was set up, had one function and
one function only. That was to provide services of a specialized
nature to the battalion generally and to the firing batteries in
particular. Previously this function was a function of a com-
bined Headquarters and Service Battery. In the next chapter,
the reasons for the dissolution and rejuvenation of this combined
battery will be discussed.
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THE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE OP THE S4 AND SERVICE BATTERY
In 19^9 the Marine Corps put Into effect the K Table of
Organization. This described in detail the exact structure, on
a peacetime and wartime basis, of the entire Fleet Marine Force,
Though the infantry unit*s structure was purely a Marine innova-
tion, the organization of the artillery units followed, to a
large extent, those of their Army counterparts. It was by follow-
ing this Army philosophy that the Service Battery described in
the last chapter was set up. The basic idea behind the origina-
tion of this unit was to effect greater flexibility of the
service element and place it under the command of the person,
the S4, who made the plans for its use and deployment.
The S4 now had two hats, one as Service Battery commander
and the other as the S4 on the battalion staff. In the Intro-
duction, the staff as an entity was defined as all phases of
the activity not having as their primary mission the basic mission
of the organization. It was further stated that the two main
duties of the staff were planning and service. With this merger
of the S4 and Service Battery, the responsibilities for perform-
ance of the two functions were now the responsibilities of one
person. The Table of Organization recognized this by giving the
title of the position as MS4 and Service Battery Commander.*1
Was there anything wrong with the idea of combining the
two staff functions of planning and service? It is a common
13
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device in the military service. The commander of the Marine
Division engineers Is a member of the commanding general's
special staff. The commander of the artillery regiment occupies
a like position as the commanding general's adviser on artillery
matters. But in no case does a member of the general staff have
this dual responsibility. Though a battalion S4 is not on a
general staff, his duties are precisely the same as the duties of
his counterpart on the general staff, s/ifhy then was this merger
put into effect? The obvious reason is that the combined Head-
quarters and Service Battery was not providing adequate service
2for the firing batteries. This battery was large in numbers and
unwieldly In administration. Its personnel were all working for
two bosses, the Headquarters and Service Battery commander and
the heads of their respective staff sections. There is always
a conflict between the heads of battalion staff sections and the
battery commander. Each has his Job to do but must use the same
men to do them. An example of this conflict would be when the
Headquarters and Service Battery commander would need men for a
working party of some sort and the S3 needs the same men in order
to Instruct them in fire control techniques. By cutting the
battery in half and forming the two batteries, it was hoped that
the smaller number of men per battery would lessen this unwieldi-
nesa. By placing the appropriate staff member, the S4, in command
2
In research at Headquarters, Marine Corps and Marine
Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, no definite authority was
stated for the origin of Service Battery, so the author was
forced to make hie own.
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It was hoped that this conflict between battery commanders and
section heads would also be lessened. As both a staff member
and operating commander of a battery he could better co-ordinate
the two functions in his battery, ^ee Tables 1 and 2.)
Poor control of the service elements was another weak-
ness of the combined battery. With one person responsible for
both planning and the execution of the plans, responsibility
would be definitely fixed.
Tactical reasons also entered into the split. In a fast
moving combat situation it might be better to have the control
of the service elements under one man. For purposes of disper-
sion to avoid enemy observation it would be an improvement to
have a separate unit off by itself.
One last reason for the split was the fact that morale
in the service elements was never as high as it was in the firing
batteries. This was the case because of two main reasons. First,
the firin~ batteries looked down on them because they were not
actively concerned with pumping shells into the enemy. Second,
very often the men that were misfits in the line batteries were
transferred into Headquarters and Service Battery. By the
formation of a separate battery there was hope that the battery
personnel would be given higher status in the battalion and that
a pride of unit would help the members do their Jobs mare
efficiently.
There were many good reasons for the formation of Service
Battery under the command of the SA. Unfortunately, there were
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In January of 1954, a new Table of Organization, the L
series, was adopted by the Marine Corps for Fleet Marine Force
units. In this table, Headquarters Battery and Service Battery
were again combined. The impetus behind these organisational
changes was the constant effort to place more men in the line
units from the ranks of the service elements. The separate Head-
quarters and Service batteries were the first units in the
artillery battalion to come up for revision. What with duplica-
tion in the troop messing facilities, supply, motor transport and
administrative functions, the merger of these two batteries
into one again was effected. (See Table 3.)
The personnel factor was not the only reason for the
merger, however. It was evident, in most cases, that the S4 was
performing hi 3 two jobs in a mediocre fashion. The many admin-
istrative demands placed upon him in his duties as battery
commander were detracting from his duties as Eft. Command is a
duty that requires more of a person in the military than it does
in a comparable civilian position. A commander may delegate
authority but he always retains the responsibility for the unit's
success or failure. In the Service Battery the commander had no
executive officer to take a large amount of the administrative
detail off his shoulders. The battery first sergeant was a help
in this respect, but there were many events that required an
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Battery, but their duties left them little free time to aid In
administrative work.
.rlier it was mentioned that in service units there was
always the problem of manpower to perform the housekeeping
details and the regular tasks of supply, ordnance and motor
transport. By the formation of Service Battery it was Intended
that the S4 as a battery commander would be the best person to
reconcile this problem of the constant snortage. Certainly
there is no way to alleviate the constant personnel demands for
guard duty, mess duty and working parties. But the formation
of Service Battery also increased, in some degree, the number of
these housekeeping tasks. ;vhere the S4 knew better wl^ich men
could be spared from their regular taeko tj do these odd Jobs,
the increase in the numbers of men needed served to nullify this
advantage. The Headquarters Battery commander had the same
problem, so it was practical to combine the two batteries and
have him take over all these probl;
Placing the service elements under the S4 did not offer
enough improvement in control to offset the necessary increase
In personnel. The same could be said for the tactical advantage
of a separate Service Battery area under its own commander.
It was considered a luxury that did not warrant the extra
personnel.
Morale did take a turn for the better in Service Battery.









group of men who were considered unfit to serve on the guns.
These men very- often ended up in the ammunition platoon. Any
good man in this platoon, and there were some, naturally felt
they were slighted. This situation would be true whether or not
the battery was separate or combined. Again the need for economy
in use of personnel outweighed the lesser considerations,
Service Battery was originated to give better service to
the battnlion. It accomplished this but the demands on the S4
and the extra personnel needed did not make the slight increase
in efficiency worth the price.
to *»J
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CONCLUSIONS
In studying the birth and death of Service Battery,
certain conclusions may be drawn.
First, the subdivision of a function with a resultant
increase in personnel is not necessarily effective. For example,
there had to be two motor transport chiefs when Headquarters and
Service Battery was split. The resulting increase in efficiency
was not in proportion.
Feconl, the subdividing of a cumbersome organization into
two smaller units is not always the answer to the problem. In
this case, size of the unit was not the deciding factor, but
rather a combination of size and complexity. The small size of
the two new batteries was a help in combatting the unwieldiness,
but the reduction in size did not decrease, rather it increased
the complexities of the problem as a whole. Two men instead of
one were now worrying about the same type of problem, neither
one coming up with a perfect answer.
Third, the staff functions of planning and service do
not work well together if the planning phase is broad in scope
and is important enough to be on the general or battalion staff
level. The problem of staff supervision is avoided by a merger
of the two functions of planning and the carrying out of these
plans by a service unit, but a greater problem of becoming too
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Fourth, though not an Identifiable factor in this case,
the ability of staff organizations to expand and become the
served instead of the servers, must be constantly kept under
surveillance.
As noted in the Introduction, the similarity between
the military line and staff organization and its business
counterparts is a strong one. The discussion of the formation
and dissolution of Service Battery has certainly left no pat







Table of Organization for a Service Battery 105MM
Howitzer Battalion Artillery Regiment,
Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
showing internal organization and
strength of component units*
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Plat Hq
USMC USN
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OFF ENL OFF ENL
Peace 13
War 15
Source: Table of Organization - Number K-1105, Headquarters
United States Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C, 16 May 1949
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TABLE 2 - HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
Table of Organization aa described in Table 1*
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Legend: Peace and War
War Only
Source: Table of Organization - Number K-1106, Headquarters




Table of Organization for Headquarters & Service Battery
105MM Howitzer Battalion (Towed) Artillery Regiment,
Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force showing inter-
nal organization and strength of component units*
HEADQUARTERS & 5ERVICE BATTERY
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Source: Table of Organization - Number L-1107, Headquarters
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